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Abstract. We study the computation of Nash equilibria in a two-player
normal form game from the perspective of parameterized complexity.
Recent results proved hardness for a number of variants, when parame-
terized by the support size. We complement those results, by identifying
three cases in which the problem becomes fixed-parameter tractable.
These cases occur in the previously studied settings of sparse games
and unbalanced games as well as in the newly considered case of locally
bounded treewidth games that generalizes both these two cases.
1 Introduction
Algorithmic game theory is a quite recent yet rapidly developing discipline that
lies at the intersection of computer science and game theory. The emergence of
the internet has given rise to numerous applications in this area such as online
auctions, online advertising, and search engine page ranking, where humans and
computers interact with each other as selfish agents negotiating to maximize
their own payoff utilities. The amount of research spent in attempting to devise
computational models and algorithms for studying these types of interactions has
been overwhelming in recent years; unsurprisingly perhaps, when one considers
the economical rewards available in this venture.
The central problem in algorithmic game theory is that of computing a Nash
equilibrium, a set of strategies for each player in a given game, where no player
can gain by changing his strategy when all other players strategies remain fixed.
This problem is so important because Nash equilibria provide a good way to pre-
dict the outcomes of many of the scenarios described above, and other scenarios
as well. Furthermore, Nash’s Theorem states that for any finite game a mixed
Nash equilibrium always exists. However, for this concept to be meaningful for
predicting behaviors of rational agents which are in many cases computers, a
natural prerequisite is for it to be computable. This led researchers such as Pa-
padimitriou to dub the problem of computing Nash equilibria as one of the most
important complexity problems of our time [25].
The initial breakthrough in determining the complexity of computing Nash
equilibria was made by Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou [11, 20]. These
two papers introduced a reduction technique which was used by the authors for
showing that computing a Nash equilibrium in a four player game is PPAD-
complete. Shortly afterwards, this hardness result was simultaneously extended
to three player games by Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [15], and by Chen and
2Deng [5]. The case of two player (bimatrix) games was finally cracked a year
later by Chen and Deng [6], who proved it to be PPAD-complete. This implied
the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm for the core case of bimatrix games
to be unlikely.
Since the result of Chen and Deng [6], the focus on computing Nash equilibria
in bimatrix games was directed either towards finding approximate Nash equilib-
ria [3, 7–9, 12, 13, 23], or towards finding special cases where exact equilibria can
be computed in polynomial time [2, 8, 10, 21, 23]. Nevertheless, for general bima-
trix games the best known algorithm for computing either approximate or exact
equilibria essentially tries all possibilities for the support of both players (the set
of strategies played with non-zero probability), which can be assumed to be at
most logarithmic in the approximate case [23]. Once the support of both players
is known, one can compute a Nash equilibrium by solving a linear-program.
Theorem 1 ([24]). A Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game, where the support
sizes are bounded by k, can be computed in nO(k) time.
Due to the central role that the algorithm of Theorem 1 plays in comput-
ing exact and approximate Nash equilibria, it is natural to ask whether one
can improve on its running-time substantially. In particular, can we remove the
dependency on the support size from the exponent? The standard framework
for answering such questions is that of parameterized complexity theory [16, 19].
Estivill-Castro and Parsa initiated the study of computing Nash equilibria in this
context [18] . They showed that when the support size is taken as a parameter,
the problem is W[2]-hard even in certain restricted settings. The implication of
their result is a negative answer to the above question. In particular, combin-
ing their reduction with the results of Chen et al. [4] gives a sharp contrast to
Theorem 1 above.
Theorem 2 ([18]). Unless FPT=W[1], there is no no(k) time algorithm for
computing a Nash equilibrium with support size at most k in a bimatrix game.
The consequence of Theorem 2 above is devastating in the sense that for
large enough games that have equilibriums with reasonably small supports, the
task of computing equilibria already becomes infeasible. The main motivation
of this paper is to find scenarios where one can circumvent this. Our goal is
thus to identify natural parameters which govern the complexity of computing
Nash equilibria, and which can help in devising feasible algorithms. We believe
that this direction can prove to be fruitful in the quest for understanding the
computational limitations of this fundamental problem. Indeed, prior to our
work, Kalyanaraman and Umans [21] provided a fixed-parameter algorithm for
finding equilibrium in bimatrix games whose matrices have small rank (and some
additional constraints).
Our techniques are based on considering a natural graph-theoretic represen-
tation of bimatrix games. This is done by taking the union of the underlying
boolean matrix of the two given payoff matrices, and considering this matrix
as the biadjacency matrix of a bipartite graph. A similar approach was taken
3by [10], and in particular by [2] who considered games that have an underly-
ing planar graph structure. Our work complements both these results as will be
explained further on.
A natural class of games that has a convenient interpretation in the graph-
theoretic context is the class of ℓ-sparse games [8, 10, 14]. Here each column and
row in both payoff matrices of the game have at most ℓ non-zero entries. An
initial tempting approach in these types of games would be to try to devise a
parameterized algorithm with ℓ taken as a single parameter. However, Chen,
Deng, and Teng [8] showed that unless PPAD = P, there is no algorithm for
computing an ε-approximate equilibrium for a 10-sparse game in time polynomial
both in ε and n. Thus, such an FPT algorithm cannot exist unless PPAD is in P.
We complement this result by showing that if ℓ is taken as a parameter, and the
size of the supports is taken as an additional parameter, then computing Nash
equilibrium is fixed-parameter tractable.
Theorem 3. A Nash equilibrium in a ℓ-sparse bimatrix game, where the support
sizes is bounded by k, can be computed in ℓO(kℓ) · nO(1) time.
Note that the above result also complements the polynomial-time algorithms
given in [8, 10] for 2-sparse games. While in these algorithms there was no as-
sumption made on the size of support of the equilibrium to be found, both
algorithms could handle only win-lose games [1, 9], games with boolean payoff
matrices.
Our second result is concerned with k-unbalanced games, games where the
row player has a small set of k strategies [21, 23]. Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta [23]
observed that in such games there is always an equilibrium where the row player
plays a strategy with support size at most k + 1. Thus, by applying Theorem 1
one can find a Nash equilibrium in nO(k) time for these types of games. Can
this result be improved to an algorithm running in f(k) · nO(1) time? We give
a partial answer to this question, by showing that if the number ℓ of different
payoffs of the row player is taken as an additional parameter, the problem indeed
becomes fixed-parameter tractable.
Theorem 4. A Nash equilibrium in a k-unbalanced bimatrix game, where the
row player has ℓ different payoff values, can be computed in ℓO(k
2) · nO(1) time.
Our last result considers bimatrix games whose corresponding graph has a
convenient structural property, namely the property of having locally bounded
treewidth. Note that both ℓ-sparse games and k-unbalanced games have cor-
responding graphs with this property, as well as the games with an underly-
ing planar graph structure considered by [2]. We show that in games of locally
bounded treewidth, where the payoff matrices have at most ℓ different values,
one can compute a Nash equilibrium in f(k, ℓ) ·nO(1). Although this might seem
as a generalization of both of our results mentioned above, the reader should
note that here we have a stricter requirement on the number of different values
in the payoff matrices, and the running-time dependency on both parameters
increases much faster.
4Theorem 5. A Nash equilibrium in a locally bounded treewidth game, where the
support sizes are bounded by k, and the payoff matrices have at most ℓ different
values, can be computed computed in f(k, ℓ) · nO(1) time for some computable
function f().
The paper is organized as follows: We begin with some preliminaries in Sec-
tion 2. In Section 3 we consider ℓ-sparse games and prove Theorem 3. Section 4
addresses locally bounded treewidth games and proves Theorem 5. Finally, in
Section 5 we prove Theorem 4 regarding k-unbalanced games.
2 Preliminaries
Let G := (A,B) be a bimatrix game, where A,B ∈ Qn×n are the payoff matrices
of the row and the column players respectively. The row (column) player has
a strategy space consisting of the rows (columns) [n] := {1 · · ·n}. (For ease of
notation, except in unbalanced games, we assume that both players have the
same number of strategies; different numbers of strategies do not affect any of
our results.) The row (column) player chooses a strategy profile x (resp. y), which
is a probability distribution over his strategy space, that is, xi, yj ≥ 0, ∀i, j, and
furthermore
∑n
i=1 xi = 1 and
∑n
j=1 yj = 1. The expected outcomes of the game
for the row and the column players are xTAy and xTBy respectively.
The players are rational, always aiming for maximizing their expected payoffs.
They have reached a Nash equilibrium if the current strategies x and y are such
that neither player has a deviating strategy x′ resp. y′ such that x′TAy > xTAy
resp. xTBy′ > xTBy, i.e., if neither of them can improve his payoff independently
of the other. The following proposition gives an equivalent condition for a pair
of strategies to be an equilibrium.
Lemma 1. ([24, Chapter 3]) The pair of strategy vectors (x, y) is a Nash equi-
librium for the bimatrix game (A,B) if and only if
(i) xs > 0⇒ (Ay)s ≥ (Ay)j for all j 6= s;
(ii) ys > 0⇒ (x
TB)s ≥ (x
TB)j for all j 6= s.
The support of a strategy vector x is defined as the set S(x) = {i|xi > 0}.
Note that the above proposition implies that if (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium,
in the column vector Ay, the entries in S(x) are equivalent and no less than
all other entries not in S(x); symmetrically, in the row vector xTB, the entries
in S(y) are equivalent and no less than other entries not in S(y). It is known
that, given possible supports I, J ⊆ [n] it can be efficiently decided whether
there is a matching Nash equilibrium, and the corresponding strategy vectors
can be computed via linear programming (Theorem 1).
The following graph associated with a bimatrix game is useful for presenting
our algorithms in Sections 3 and 4.
Definition 1. Let G = (A,B) be a bimatrix game with A,B ∈ Qn×n. The
undirected (and bipartite) graph G = G(G) associated with G is defined to be the
5bipartite graph with vertex classes Vr, Vc := [n], referred to as row resp. column
vertices. There is an edge between i ∈ Vr and j ∈ Vc iff Ai,j 6= 0 or Bi,j 6= 0.
As a last bit of notation: For I, J ⊆ [n], and any n×n matrix A, we use AI,J
to denote the submatrix composed of rows in I and columns in J . We also
use AI,∗ as a shorthand for AI,[n]. Thus, Ai,∗ means the i’th row of A.
3 Sparse Games
In this section we present the proof for Theorem 3. Throughout the section we let
G := (A,B) denote our given bimatrix game, where A and B are rational value
matrices with at most ℓ non-zero entries per row or column. We will present
an algorithm for finding an Nash equilibrium where the support sizes of both
players are at most k (and k is taken as a parameter). The high-level strategy is
to show that it suffices to search for equilibria that induce one or two connected
components in the associated graph G = G(G). This permits us to find candidate
support sets by enumerating subgraphs of G (on one or two components).
We begin by introducing minimal equilibria:
Definition 2. A Nash equilibrium (x, y) is minimal if for any Nash equilib-
rium (x′, y′) with S(x′) ⊆ S(x) and S(y′) ⊆ S(y), we have S(x′) = S(x)
and S(y′) = S(y).
Our algorithm iterates through all possible support sizes k1, k2 ≤ k in increas-
ing order to determine whether there exists an equilibrium (x, y) with |S(x)| = k1
and S(y) = k2. To avoid cumbersome notation, we will assume that k1 = k2 = k
(extending this to general case will be immediate). Thus at a given iteration, the
algorithm can assume that no equilibrium exists with smaller supports, i.e. it
can restrict its search to minimal equilibriums. This fact will prove crucial later
on. Furthermore, since our game is ℓ-sparse, our algorithm only needs to search
for equilibriums where both player receive non-negative payoffs.
Lemma 2. If G = (A,B) is an ℓ-sparse game, where A,B ∈ Qn×n and n > ℓk,
then in any Nash equilibrium with support at most k × k, both players receive
non-negative payoffs.
For an equilibrium (x, y), let the extended support of x be the rows S(x) ∪
N(S(y)), and similarly for y, where the neighborhood N(I) is taken over the
graph G := G(G) of the game. Note that any row not in the extended support
of x would have payoff constantly zero given the current strategy of y, and thus
is not important for the existence of an equilibrium. We will show that for a
minimal equilibrium (x, y), the extended supports of x and y induce a subgraph
of G which has at most two connected components. This will be done in two
steps: The first is the special case where AS(x),S(y) = BS(x),S(y) = 0, while the
second corresponds to the remaining cases.
6Lemma 3. If (x, y) is a minimal Nash equilibrium for a game (A,B) with
AS(x),S(y) = BS(x),S(y) = 0, then the subgraphs induced by N [S(x)] and N [S(y)]
in the graph associated with the game are both connected.
Proof. Let Gx := G[N [S(x)]] be the subgraph of G induced by N [S(x)], and
aiming towards a contradiction, suppose that Gx is disconnected. Let C be a
connected component in Gx, and write p :=
∑
i∈Vr(C)
xi to denote the prob-
ability that a row strategy in C is played according to x. Now define a new
row strategy by setting xˆi = xi/p if i ∈ Vx, and xˆi = 0 otherwise. We argue
that (xˆ, y) is a Nash equilibrium, contradicting the fact that (x, y) is minimal.
Obviously, the expected payoff in (xˆ, y) is zero for both players, as AS(xˆ),S(y)
= BS(xˆ),S(y) = 0. Furthermore, there is no row i such that (Ay)i > 0, since the
strategy y is unchanged and the original strategy pair (x, y) is an equilibrium.
Now assume that there is a column j such that (xˆTB)j > 0. Then Bi,j 6= 0
for some i ∈ S(xˆ), and by the connectivity assumption we must have Bi,j = 0
for all i ∈ S(x) \ S(xˆ), but then (xTB)j = p(xˆ
TB)j > 0, which contradicts the
assumption that (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium. By Lemma 1, it follows that (xˆ, y)
is a Nash equilibrium. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. If (x, y) is a minimal Nash equilibrium for a game (A,B) with either
AS(x),S(y) 6= 0 or BS(x),S(y) 6= 0, and with a non-negative payoff for both players,
then the subgraph induced by N [S(x) ∪ S(y)] is connected.
Proof. Let H be the subgraph induced by N [S(x) ∪ S(y)] and suppose that H
is disconnected. We will derive a contradiction by showing that (x, y) is not
minimal.
Let C be a connected component in H intersecting both S(x) and S(y), and
let Vxˆ := Vr(C)∩S(x) and Vyˆ := Vc(C)∩S(y) denote the set of row and column
strategies in C, respectively. We define a new pair of strategy profiles (xˆ, yˆ) where
S(xˆ) = Vxˆ and S(yˆ) = Vyˆ, by normalizing (x, y) onto Vxˆ and Vyˆ. That is, we let
p :=
∑
i∈Vxˆ
xi, and set xˆi = xi/p if i ∈ Vxˆ, and xˆi = 0 otherwise. Similarly, we
let q :=
∑
j∈Vyˆ
yi, and set yˆ accordingly. As either S(xˆ) ⊂ S(x) or S(yˆ) ⊂ S(y),
to prove the lemma it suffices to argue that (xˆ, yˆ) is an equilibrium.
Consider a row strategy i ∈ [n]. We claim
(Ayˆ)i =
{
(Ay)i/q if Ai,Vyˆ 6= 0,
0 otherwise.
(1)
The second case is clear. For the first case, assume that Ai,Vyˆ 6= 0. Now,
if Ai,j 6= 0 for j ∈ S(y) \ Vyˆ , then there would be an edge in H from the
vertex corresponding to row i, which is in C, to the vertex corresponding to
column j, which is not in C, contradicting that C is a connected component.
Thus
(Ay)i =
∑
j∈S(y)
Ai,jyj =
∑
j∈Vyˆ
Ai,j(qyˆj) +
∑
j∈S(y)\Vyˆ
Ai,jyj = q(Ayˆ)i + 0
and the claim follows.
7Now let s ∈ S(xˆ), and consider some arbitrary row strategy i ∈ [n]. As-
sume by way of contradiction that (Ayˆ)s < (Ayˆ)i. It is clear that Ai,Vyˆ 6= 0,
thus (Ayˆ)i = (Ay)i/q; we consider the cases for row s. If As,Vyˆ 6= 0, then
by (1), we have (Ayˆ)s = (Ay)s/q, implying (Ay)s < (Ay)i. On the other hand,
if As,Vyˆ = 0 but As,S(y) 6= 0, then C would not be a connected component of H
(since a neighbor of s would be missing).
Thus As,S(y) = 0 and (Ay)s = (Ayˆ)s = 0, and (Ay)i = q(Ayˆ)i > 0. In both
cases we contradict that (x, y) is an equilibrium. Thus we fulfill condition (i)
of Lemma 1, and by symmetry we also fulfill condition (ii). We have shown
that (xˆ, yˆ) is an equilibrium, contradicting the minimality of (x, y). ⊓⊔
As an immediate corollary of Lemma 3 and 4, we get that the subgraph in
G(G) induced by the extended support of a minimal equilibrium has at most two
connected components. In the following lemma we show that in graphs of small
maximum degree, we can find all such subgraphs quite efficiently. This will allow
us to find a small, minimal equilibrium by checking all sets of rows and columns
that would be candidates for being the extended supports of one.
Lemma 5. Let G be a graph on n vertices and with maximum degree ∆ = ∆(G).
In time (∆ + 1)2t · nc+O(1) one can enumerate all subgraphs on t vertices that
consist of c connected components.
Proof. We first show how to enumerate all connected subgraphs on t vertices in
time (∆ + 1)2t · nO(1) by a branching algorithm. At any point selected vertices
will be active or passive. When a vertex is selected it will first be active and later
be set to passive. Selecting a vertex and making it active respectively setting a
vertex to passive is called an event.
First, we branch on the choice of one out of n starting vertices in G and set
it active. Then until we have selected t vertices we do the following: We consider
the least recently added active vertex and branch on one of at most ∆ + 1
events, namely selecting one of its at most ∆ neighbors (and making it active) or
setting the vertex itself to passive. We terminate when we have selected t vertices
(and output the corresponding subgraph) or when there are no more active
vertices. Clearly, on each branch of this algorithm there are at most 2t events.
Thus the branching tree has at most (∆+ 1)2t leaves, implying a total runtime
of (∆+1)2t ·nO(1). Observe that for every connected subgraph on t vertices there
is a sequence of events such that the graph occurs in the enumeration.
The generalization to c components is straightforward: When there are no
more active vertices but we have not yet selected c components, then we select
one of the less than n remaining vertices of G as a new active vertex, starting
a new component. Selecting new starting vertices adds a factor of nc to our
runtime. ⊓⊔
We are now in position to describe our entire algorithm. It first iterates
through all possible sizes of extended support in increasing order. In each itera-
tion, it enumerates all subgraphs that might correspond to the extended support
of a minimal equilibrium. It then checks all ways of selecting a support from the
8given subgraph, and for each such selection it uses the algorithm behind Theo-
rem 1 to check whether there is an equilibrium on the support. If no equilibrium
is found throughout the whole process, the algorithm reports that there exists
no equilibrium with support size at most k in G. The running time is bounded
by ℓO(kℓ)nO(1) from Lemma 5, times
(
kℓ+k
k
)2
= 2O(kℓ) ways of selecting the sup-
port, times nO(1) for checking for an equilibrium. In total, we get a running time
of ℓO(kℓ)nO(1).
Finally, completeness comes from the exhaustiveness of Lemma 5 and the
structure given by Lemmas 3 and 4.
3.1 Games with Non-negative Payoffs
In the case that the payoffs of our games are non-negative, i.e., A,B ∈ Qn×n≥0 ,
we can reduce our running time to be polynomial in ℓ, for ℓ-sparse games. We
begin with a strengthening of Lemmas 3 and 4.
Lemma 6. Let G = (A,B) be a bimatrix game with A,B ∈ Qn×n≥0 , and G be
the graph associated with G. If (x, y) is a minimal Nash equilibrium for G, then
either |S(x)| = |S(y)| = 1, or G[S(x) ∪ S(y)] is connected.
Proof. Let GS := G[S(x) ∪ S(y)]; assume that GS is not connected. If the ex-
pected outcome is zero, then (since the entries are non-negative) every entry
in AS(x),∗ and B∗,S(y) is zero, and we get an equilibrium by selecting any sin-
gle row i ∈ S(x) and column j ∈ S(y). Otherwise, every row of AS(x),S(y) and
every column of BS(x),S(y) contains some positive entry. Let C be a connected
component of GS on row vertices Vxˆ and column vertices Vyˆ, and define a new
pair of strategy profiles (xˆ, yˆ) where S(xˆ) = Vxˆ and S(yˆ) = Vyˆ, by normalizing
(x, y) onto Vxˆ and Vyˆ as in Lemma 4.
We will argue that (xˆ, yˆ) is an equilibrium.
Let s ∈ Vxˆ, and assume by way of contradiction that for some row i ∈ [n], we
have (Ayˆ)i > (Ayˆ)s. Let (Ayˆ)s = c0; by non-connectivity of GS , (Ay)s = qc0.
Further let (Ayˆ)i = c1 and (Ay)i = qc1 + (1 − q)c2. Now (Ay)s = qc0 < qc1 ≤
qc1 + (1 − q)c2 = (Ay)i, contradicting our assumptions; the last inequality is
because the entries are non-negative. Repeating the argument symmetrically, we
find that (xˆ, yˆ) is a Nash equilibrium. ⊓⊔
Thus, to find an equilibrium in G = (A,B), it suffices to search for occurrences
of the support, rather than the extended support. Invoking Lemma 5 directly
with a bound of 2k vertices gives a running time of ℓO(k)nO(1).
4 Locally Bounded Treewidth Games
Let G = (A,B) be a given game with A,B ∈ Pn×n, with P ⊂ Q, |P | ≤ ℓ, and
let G = G(G) the graph associated with G. In this section we will present an
algorithm that finds an equilibrium with support sizes at most k when G comes
from a graph class with locally bounded treewidth. Note that this is a partial
9extension of the results of the previous section, as graphs of bounded degree have
locally bounded treewidth, while on the other hand we assume that there is a
bounded set P of only ℓ different payoff values which can occur in the games.
(The case P = {0, 1} would correspond to win-lose games.)
Definition 3 ([17]). A graph class has locally bounded treewidth if there is
a function f : N → N such that for every graph G := (V,E) of the class, any
vertex v ∈ V , and any d ∈ N, the subgraph of G induced by all vertices within
distance at most d from v has treewidth at most f(d).
We refer readers to [19] for more details on the notion of treewidth and locally
bounded treewidth. The crucial property of locally bounded treewidth graphs
in our context is that first-order queries can be answered in FPT time on such
graphs when the parameter is the size of first-order formula [19, Chapter 12.2].
For ease of presentation we show how to find an equilibrium where both
players have support size k (the algorithm can be easily adapted to support
sizes k1, k2 ≤ k). Let I and J be two subsets of k elements in [n]. We say that two
matrices A∗, B∗ ∈ Qk×k occur in G at (I, J) if A∗ = AI,J and B
∗ = BI,J . The
pair (A∗, B∗) forms an equilibrium pattern if there exists an equilibrium (x, y)
where (A∗, B∗) occur in G at (S(x), S(y)). Our algorithm will try all possible ℓ2k
2
pairs of matrices (A∗, B∗), and for each such pair it will determine whether it is
an equilibrium pattern.
When does a pair of matrices (A∗, B∗) form an equilibrium pattern? The first
obvious condition is that it occurs in G at some pair of position sets (I, J). Fur-
thermore, by definition of a Nash equilibrium, there is a pair of strategies (x, y)
with S(x) = I and S(y) = J , such that neither player has a better alternative.
The difficulty here lies in the fact that, even given the support S(y) of the col-
umn player, there may be too many possible strategies for the row player that
have supports different from I. To circumvent this, we define equivalence of rows
with respect to supports S(y), and of columns with respect to supports S(x).
Definition 4. Let I, J ⊆ [n]. Two rows i1, i2 ∈ [n] are J-equivalent if Ai1,J =
Ai2,J . Similarly, two columns j1, j2 ∈ [n] are I-equivalent if BI,j1 = BI,j2 .
Lemma 7. Let J be the support of the column player. For any row strategy x
there is a row strategy xˆ such that:
(i) the support S(xˆ) contains at most one row from each J-equivalence class
(ii) and for any column strategy y with support J we have xˆTAy = xTAy.
The same is true for column strategies, given a support I of the row player.
For each possible equilibrium pattern (A∗, B∗) we do the following. For
each choice of rows A† ⊆ P 1×k that do not occur in A∗ and each choice of
columns B† ⊆ P k×1 that do not occur in B∗, we create two matrices
C =
(
A∗ 0
A† 0
)
and D =
(
B∗ B†
0 0
)
.
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We use Theorem 1 to see if there is an equilibrium (x, y) in the game (C,D)
with S(x) = S(y) = [k]. If there is such an equilibrium, then we proceed as
follows to find an occurrence of (A∗, B∗) that avoids the rows and columns
which were not chosen. For this let F1 be the rows which occur neither in A
∗
nor in A† and let F2 be the columns which occur neither in B
∗ nor in B†. We
say that F1 and F2 are forbidden for (A
∗, B∗). We note that given (A∗, B∗), a
set of rows F1 ⊆ P
1×k, and a set of columns F2 ⊆ P
k×1, one can write a first-
order formula of size bounded by some function in k and |P | = ℓ to determine
whether (A∗, B∗) has an occurrence which avoids F1 and F2.
Example 1. Consider a win-lose game (A,B) encoded into relations A and B
such that A(r, c) is true iff Ar,c = 1, and likewise for B. Then a 2×2 equilibrium
where the pattern is two identity matrices can be found with the formula
∃r1, r2, c1, c2A(r1, c1) ∧ ¬A(r1, c2) ∧ ¬A(r2, c1) ∧ A(r2, c2)∧
B(r1, c1) ∧ ¬B(r1, c2) ∧ ¬B(r2, c1) ∧B(r2, c2)∧
∀r′(¬A(r′, c1) ∨ ¬A(r
′, c2)) ∧ ∀c
′(¬B(r1, c
′) ∨ ¬B(r2, c
′)).
In general, with ℓ different values, there would be ℓ − 1 relations Ai and Bi
encoding the game, where Ai(r, c) is true if Ar,c = zi, for every zi ∈ P except
the zero value.
Since the number of possible choices for F1 and F2 is bounded by some function
in k and ℓ, and for each such choice we can determine whether F1 and F2 is a
forbidden pair for (A∗, B∗) in polynomial-time, the total time for determining
whether (A∗, B∗) is an equilibrium pattern is FPT in k and ℓ. Since the number
of pairs (A∗, B∗) is also bounded by a function in k, the total running time of
our entire algorithm is also FPT in k and ℓ.
To complete the proof of Theorem 5, let us briefly argue completeness. As-
sume that there is any equilibrium with support sizes equal to k, let I and J be
the supports, and let A∗ and B∗ be corresponding sub-matrices. Observe that
we may set all entries in columns outside J of A to zero without harm, ditto for
rows outside I in B. According to Lemma 7 it suffices to keep one copy of each
row outside A∗ in A (also discard the corresponding zero-row in B to keep the
size the same). The same is of course true for columns outside B∗ in B. Except
for a permutation this is equal to one of the games (C,D) that we considered.
Therefore our algorithm will find such an equilibrium if one exists.
5 Unbalanced Games
In this section we briefly consider k-unbalanced bimatrix games. A bimatrix
game (A,B) is k-unbalanced if A,B ∈ Qk×n≥0 for some k << n [21, 23] (i.e.,
the row player has a significantly smaller number of strategies than the column
player). We will show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed in FPT-time
with respect to k and ℓ, where ℓ denotes the number of different payoffs that the
row player has, i.e., ℓ := |{Ai,j : 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ n}|.
11
Similar to Definition 4 we define two column strategies i, j ∈ [n] to be equiv-
alent if A∗,i = A∗,j . (However, notice that unlike Definition 4, here equivalence
of column strategies is defined with respect to the row player payoff.)
Lemma 8. For each equilibrium there is an equilibrium where the column player
plays at most one column from each equivalence class.
Using Lemma 8 we can easily devise an FPT algorithm for computing a
Nash equilibrium in our setting. The algorithm simply guesses the support of
the row player and column player, and then uses the method of Theorem 1 to
determine whether there exists a Nash equilibrium corresponding to these sets of
supports. Observe that there are at most ℓk column-strategy equivalence classes.
Furthermore, according to Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta [23], in a k-unbalanced
game there always exists an equilibrium where the column player has support
size at most k+1. Thus the number of guesses the algorithm makes is bounded
by 2k ·
(
ℓk
k+1
)
= ℓO(k
2), and for each such guess, the amount of time required is
polynomial. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
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A Omitted proofs
A.1 Section 4
Proof (Lemma 7). We prove the lemma row strategies given a support J of
the column player. The proof for column strategies is similar. Let x be a row
strategy which includes two strategies i1 and i2 that are J-equivalent. It suffices
to show that there is a row strategy xˆ with S(xˆ) = S(x) \ i2 and xˆ
TAy = xTAy
for any column strategy y with support J . For this, take xˆ to be the strategy
defined by xˆi1 := xi1 + xi2 , xˆi2 := 0, and xˆi = xi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i1, i2}.
Let y be any column strategy with S(y) = J . By definition of J-equivalence, we
have (Ay)i1 = (Ay)i2 . Thus, we get that
(xˆTAy)i1 + (xˆ
TAy)i2 = (x
TAy)i1 + (x
TAy)i2 .
Furthermore, since xˆ and x equal on all entries i ∈ [n] \ {i1, i2}, we know that∑
i6=i1,i2
(xˆTAy)i =
∑
i6=i1,i2
(xTAy)i,
and thus
(xˆTAy) =
∑
i6=i1,i2
(xˆTAy)i + (xˆ
TAy)i1 + (xˆ
TAy)i2
=
∑
i6=i1,i2
(xTAy)i + (x
TAy)i1 + (x
TAy)i2 = (x
TAy).
Therefore xˆTAy = xTAy for all column strategies y with S(y) = J . ⊓⊔
A.2 Section 5
Proof (Lemma 8). Let (x, y) be an equilibrium, and suppose that S(y) includes
two equivalent strategies i and j. To prove the lemma it suffices to show that
the there exists an equilibrium (x, y∗) with S(y∗) = S(y) \ {j}. For this, let us
take y∗ to be the strategy vector defined by y∗i := yi + yj , y
∗
j := 0, and y
∗
x = yx
for all x ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{i, j}. Clearly S(y∗) = S(y)\{j}. Thus, for each s ∈ S(y∗)
we have
(xTB)s ≥ (x
TB)j , ∀j 6= s,
since this condition holds for all s ∈ S(y) ⊇ S(y∗) by Lemma 1. Furthermore, due
to the definition of equivalence, a simple calculation shows that (Ay)s = (Ay
∗)s
for all s ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Therefore, for each s ∈ S(x), we get again using Lemma 1
that
(Ay∗)s = (Ay)s ≥ (Ay)j , ∀j 6= s.
It follows that (x, y∗) satisfies both conditions of Lemma 1, and so it is indeed
an equilibrium. ⊓⊔
